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The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or mis-
represent reality (i.e., possess a ‘Theory of Mind’) is hotly debated. This understanding
plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communi-
cating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the
‘Sally-Anne Task’, because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test
examining one’s understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in
addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessar-
ily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children—the ‘curse of
knowledge’ (the tendency to be biased by one’s knowledge when considering less-informed
perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old’s (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across
tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that
when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at infer-
ring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the
classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously
observed developmental changes in children’s performance could be attributed to the ability
to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between
individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead
be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge,
highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false
belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.
Introduction
The capacity to recognize that others have minds, and reason about the contents of those
minds, is critical for navigating our social world. Often referred to as a ‘Theory of Mind’, this
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capacity is essential for understanding human action [1], it also provides the foundation for
cultural learning [2, 3], reduces prejudice [4], and fosters prosocial behavior [5–8]. The ontog-
eny of this capacity in humans has intrigued philosophers and researchers for decades. When
do children understand that others have minds that represent, and therefore can misrepresent,
reality? In some of the earliest work investigating this question researchers used what became
known as the Sally-Anne Task (a.k.a., the Classic False Belief task, Maxi Task, or Change-of-
Location task; [9]). In this task, children observe a scenario where a protagonist (e.g., Sally)
hides an object in one location and leaves the scene. In Sally’s absence, another character (e.g.,
Anne) hides the object in a different location. Then, children are asked where Sally will look
for the object when she returns. The logic is as follows: if children can predict that Sally will
look for the object where she originally hid it—because she will not know what transpired in
her absence and thus will hold a false belief—then they understand that a mind can misrepre-
sent reality [9–12]. Across hundreds of replications of this task, and others like it [11–14],
3-year-olds consistently fail by indicating that Sally will first look for the object where it is cur-
rently (and where they know it to be), whereas by around 4.5 to 5 years of age, children tend to
correctly infer Sally’s false belief (see 14, for meta-analysis).
Notably, Theory of Mind is a multifaceted capacity that is much broader than simply pass-
ing the Sally-Anne task, or reasoning about false beliefs. A ‘theory of mind’ is generally
believed to involve a suite of abilities like reasoning about emotions, intentions, desires, knowl-
edge, and much more (for review, see [15]). To examine the developmental trajectory of differ-
ent Theory of Mind abilities researchers have designed various measures such as the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Test [16], Belief-Desire Reasoning task [17], Strange Stories [18], among
many others (e.g., [19–23]). Together, these findings reveal that there is important develop-
ment in Theory of Mind both before and after children succeed at classic false belief tasks.
Despite the existence of several innovations in Theory of Mind measures, the classic Sally-
Anne task is still by far the most widely used measure in the literature, especially for pre-
school-age children. As of 2020, the original work by Wimmer and Perner has been cited
7,733 times [9], and Wellman and Liu’s Theory of Mind Scale (which includes a variant of the
false belief task) has been cited 1,978 times [24]. For better or worse, the Sally-Anne task
remains the gold standard in developmental and cognitive science providing the primary foun-
dation for various fields of research relating to the understanding of the mind such as its
neuroanatomical loci [25, 26], its role in Autism Spectrum Disorder [27, 28], and ADHD [see,
29], as well as its various cognitive and environmental correlates [30–34], and its ability to pre-
dict a whole host of social outcomes such as one’s tendency to exhibit empathy and prosocial
behavior [see 8], the degree of one’s peer relationship problems [35–37], and one’s academic
success [38, 39]. Given that performance on this task is such a widely used predictor of various
social outcomes, and it forms the bedrock on which several fields of research have been built,
it is imperative to understand precisely what it is measuring and which aspects of cognition
account for the developmental differences.
Unfortunately, there is still widespread disagreement among researchers about what the
Sally-Anne task is measuring, and why 3-year-olds fail this classic task [40–42]. One interpreta-
tion, sometimes referred to as the ‘Fundamental Change’ view, is that 3-year-olds do not yet
comprehend that others have minds that can misrepresent reality [14, 43, 44]. Another inter-
pretation, sometimes referred to as the ‘Processing Demands’ view is that 3-year-olds’ more
general cognitive abilities (e.g., working memory, inhibitory control, language) are not suffi-
ciently developed to allow them to succeed. Under this latter interpretation, it is not that
3-year-olds lack the concept of false beliefs [45–47], but that developmental limitations in cog-
nitive processing abilities undermine their performance. Several variants of this latter interpre-
tation have been put forth emphasizing different cognitive processes but on the whole these
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researchers argue that if these processing demands were sufficiently reduced, even very young
children could successfully reason about false beliefs (for more accounts, see [48–50]).
Several studies have shown that when the Sally-Anne task is modified in ways that clarify
the task, increase the motivation of the participant, or minimize task demands, young chil-
dren’s false belief performance tends to improve. For example, Siegal and Beattie (1991)
changed the false belief question to where will the protagonist look for the target object first?
As opposed to, where will the protagonist look for the target object. They found that this clar-
ification improved children’s false belief performance [51]. Other researchers have shown that
when children are more actively involved in the false belief scenario, such as when they are
deceiving the protagonist by hiding the target object, young children were more likely to accu-
rately infer the protagonist’s false belief [52–56]. Still other researchers have identified that
when specific cognitive demands are reduced, including explicit response generation [e.g., 47],
executive functioning [57, 58], attentional biases [e.g., 59], and language comprehension [e.g.,
60], young children’s false belief performance tended to improve [42, 51, 52, 61].
Initially, infant research also appeared to provide support for the view that the Classic Sally-
Anne task is unnecessarily cognitively demanding for young children [62–65]. Onishi and
Baillargeon were first to demonstrate infants’ apparent ability to reason about false belief using
an experimental paradigm measuring whether infants looked longer (evidencing surprise) at
one of two visual scenes (i.e., one in which an actor behaved in line with a true belief and one
with an actor behaving in line with a false belief; [64]). This task placed fewer cognitive
demands on participants. For example, the paradigm did not require any understanding of
language, it did not require that the participant make a prediction about one’s future behavior,
nor did it require the participant to intentionally choose a response. In the absence of these
demands, even 15-month-olds seemed to understand that people can hold false beliefs [66,
67]. Recently, however, the robustness of these findings has been called into question following
several failed replication attempts from multiple labs [68–71]. Moreover, even if the initial
findings hold true, it is not the changes in infancy that have been shown to predict a host of
social outcomes—it is the changes in cognition between three and four years of age that do,
and therefore it is those changes that necessitate better understanding.
In the current study, we examine a different cognitive mechanism that has so far received
little attention—the effect of the ‘curse of knowledge’ on children’s false belief reasoning. The
curse of knowledge is the tendency to be biased by one’s own (current) knowledge when rea-
soning about a more naïve perspective (a.k.a., the ‘hindsight bias’, ‘creeping determinism’,
‘reality bias’, or the ‘knew-it-all-along effect’; [72–75]). As a classic example of the curse of
knowledge bias, adults who learn the outcome of an event (e.g., an election, a battle, a sports
game) overestimate the likelihood that others will predict that outcome. In comparison, adults
who were not informed of the event outcome tend to be more accurate in their estimates of
what others will predict [73, 76, 77].
In the Sally-Anne task, children are made aware of exactly where Anne moved the object
even though specific outcome information is not a necessary condition to infer a false belief.
Accordingly, to pass the Sally-Anne task, children are required to overcome the curse of
knowledge and infer Sally’s naïve perspective. This is especially difficult for younger children,
as they tend to be more vulnerable to the curse of knowledge than older children [78–81]. Still,
even adults’ false belief reasoning can be impaired by possessing specific outcome information
[82]. In their experiment, Birch and Bloom presented participants with a four-container false
belief task, where adults were told that a protagonist, named Vicky, was playing her violin and
then decided to go outside (Fig 1). Before leaving, she placed her violin inside a blue container.
In her absence, participants were told that the locations of the containers were altered, and the
violin was moved to another container. Some of the participants were told exactly where the
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violin was moved (e.g., red container), and others were simply told that it was moved to a dif-
ferent container, with no specific information as to where. Participants who knew it had been
moved to the red container were significantly worse at predicting Vicky’s false belief than par-
ticipants who did not know where the object had been moved. That is, adults who can
unquestionably reason about false beliefs can be biased, or ‘cursed’ so-to-speak, by their own
knowledge when reasoning about false beliefs [for replications and extensions of this work, see
83, 84]. It might be tempting to attribute the curse of knowledge to poor inhibitory control,
where an individual is biased by their knowledge because they are unable to inhibit the con-
tents of their own knowledge. While there is evidence for the role of inhibitory control on the
curse of knowledge [81, 85, 86], inhibitory control does not fully account for the curse of
knowledge [87–89]—a point we return to in greater detail in the Discussion.
Fig 1. Stimuli from Birch and Bloom’s (2007) study, where adults are given a plausible reason to believe that Vicki
would look for her violin in the current container. Note, that the red container (current container) in section B is in
the same spot as the blue container (original container) in section A. From “The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning
About False Beliefs” by Birch & Bloom (2007), Psychological Science, 18(5), 384.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141.g001
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In the current experiment, we aimed to directly examine the effect of the curse of knowl-
edge on false belief performance by manipulating children’s outcome knowledge, while keep-
ing trials consistent with one another. To test this, we employed the logic detailed in Birch
(2005) and used by Birch and Bloom (2007) and created two variants of the Sally-Anne task
[see Fig 2; 82, 90], where a protagonist hides an object in one of four containers and leaves the
scene. As in the standard task, another character moves the object in the protagonist’s absence.
Our critical manipulation was whether the participants were told specific outcome informa-
tion: For two test trials (Outcome Known, or Cursed, Trials), we kept it consistent with the
standard task and told children exactly where the object was moved (e.g., “to the blue box”). In
the other two test trials (Outcome Unknown, or Curse-Lifted, Trials), we told them that the
object was moved but did not tell them where (e.g., “to one of the other boxes”). After each test
trial, children were asked where the protagonist will look for the object. In other words, the
manipulation across test trial types allowed us to test whether eliminating, or reducing, the
effect of the curse of knowledge (i.e., in the Outcome Unknown Trials) affected children’s false
belief reasoning.
Fig 2. A depiction of the four-box Sally-Ann task used in the present experiment. The researcher presented each
child with a visual enactment of four false belief scenarios using colorful stick figures. Each scenario involved a
protagonist (a) who put an object in one of the four containers (b). Then, the protagonist leaves (c), and another
character placed the object in a different container (d). In one scenario for example, the researcher said to the child:
“Sally was playing with her ball, then she got hungry, so Sally put her ball right in here [purple container], and went
home. When Sally was gone, Ryan hid Sally’s ball in a different spot! He may have hid it here, or here, or here”
[researcher pointed to each of the other containers]. In two scenarios (i.e., Outcome Known Trials), the researcher told
the child exactly where the second character placed the object (e.g., “But we know that Ryan hid the ball here.” [blue
container]). In the other two scenarios in contrast (i.e., the Outcome Unknown Trials), the researcher told the child:
“But we don’t know where he hid it.” Both trial types ended the same way (Panel E, e.g., “Then, Sally came back. Where
will she look for her ball?”.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141.g002
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Given previous research suggesting that the curse of knowledge interferes with the ability to
reason about false beliefs (e.g., see [76]), we predicted that children would perform more accu-
rately on the false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge.
Also, considering that young children are more susceptible to the bias compared to older chil-
dren and adults [e.g., 79], we hypothesized that the age-related changes in children’s perfor-
mance on the Sally-Anne task may reflect older preschoolers’ greater ability to overcome the
curse of knowledge bias, rather than a conceptual change in their understanding of the mind.
Method
Participants
Once this study was approved by the university’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board (ID: H10-
01272), 277 three- to six-year-olds were recruited to participate. Thirty-nine of these partici-
pants’ data were excluded from analyses for reasons that interfered with the validity of their
responses. Specifically, 87% percent of the 39 excluded cases were due to a failure to complete
the experimental session because they did not answer the questions, explicitly declined to par-
ticipate, or were extremely inattentive or distracted. An additional 5% of excluded cases
involved participants with language comprehension difficulties, 5% involved participants who
were interrupted during the experiment, and another 3% had a diagnosis of Autistic Spectrum
Disorder. For the remaining two-hundred and thirty-eight cases, we excluded any trial where
children could not remember the original location of the object (as will be discussed below
and in line with previous false belief research). Thus, 230 children were retained in the final
sample (MAge = 54 months, 55% male). Of the 230 children, 37% percent were of Caucasian
descent, 17% were of East Asian descent, 12% were of mixed descent (e.g., half East Asian half
Caucasian), one child was of Arab descent, and another child was of African American
descent. Parents of the remaining 33% of the children did not disclose ethnicity information.
Participants were recruited from a multicultural North American city, via visits to community
preschools, a local children’s museum, and by contacting parents who had previously partici-
pated in a university study. Children were considered eligible to participate if they were
between 3 and 6 years of age. For analyses, participants were grouped into 3 age-categories to
examine potential developmental differences in performance: There were 91 3-year-olds
(MAge = 41.5 months, SD = 3.5 months, 56% males), 70 4-year-olds (MAge = 53 months,
SD = 3.5 months, 55% male) and 69 5&6-year-olds (MAge = 71 months, SD = 6.5 months, 54%
male).
Materials
The false belief stories were presented to children using stick figures. One laminated paper
with an image of four containers (one yellow, one purple, one red, and one blue) was presented
during the entire duration of the experiment. A total of eight stick figures were also presented.
Each stick figure was a paper cut out of a simple drawing of a person (created using Paint) that
was taped on a small stick. Two stick figures (a male and female) were presented for each false
belief trial.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet area. Each child was presented with four false belief
test trials; for each of the test trials, the experimenter presented a scenario about two characters
and acted out the scenario with two stick figures (see Fig 2, for a visual illustration of a
scenario).
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The scenario involved a protagonist who hid an object in one of four containers. Then, in
the absence of the protagonist, another character placed the object in a different container. In
two of the tasks, children were told exactly where the second character placed the object. For
example, the following scenario was presented:
“Sally was playing with her ball, then she got hungry, so Sally put her ball right in here [purple
container], and went home. When Sally was gone, Ryan hid Sally’s ball in a different spot! He
may have hid it here, or here, or here [researcher pointed to each of the other containers]. But
we know that Ryan hid the ball here [blue container]. Then, Sally came back.”
In the other two tasks, children were told that the second character moved the object to
another container, but they were not told exactly which container. For example, the following
scenario was presented:
“Bill was eating a chocolate bar, but he got full before he could finish it so he put the rest of his
chocolate bar in here [red container], so he could have it later. Then, Bill went home. When
Bill was gone Jane came, and hid his chocolate bar somewhere else! She may have hid it here,
or here, or here [researcher pointed to each of the other containers]. But, we don’t know
where she hid it. Then, Bill came back.”
After each scenario was presented, children were asked where the protagonist will look for
the object (e.g. “Where will Bill look for the chocolate bar?”), to examine their ability to infer the
protagonist’s false belief. Then, children were administered two memory checks to ensure they
had paid attention to each story: One question assessed whether children could remember
where the second character moved the object (e.g., “Do you know where the chocolate bar is
really?”) and another question assessed whether children recalled that the protagonist was
absent when the object was moved by the second character (e.g., “Did Bill see Jane moving the
chocolate bar?”). The majority of participants answered the memory questions correctly.
Importantly, children were also asked where the protagonist (e.g., Bill) left the object in the
beginning (e.g., “Do you remember where Bill put the Chocolate bar in the beginning?”). This
question is typically used as an exclusion criterion for Classic False Belief tasks because if the
child forgot where the protagonist hid the object in the beginning, then it is impossible to
assess their understanding of the protagonist’s false belief of the object’s location. Accordingly,
we only included children’s data in our analyses for test trials where they correctly remem-
bered the original location of the object.
In this experiment, we used two versions to alternate which trial type was first presented
(i.e., Outcome Known Trial or Outcome Unknown Trial; see Table 1). That is, the same sce-
narios and the same order of scenarios were used for both versions, however for Version 1 we
presented the first scenario as an Outcome Known Trial, and for Version 2 we presented the
first Scenario as an Outcome Unknown Trial.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Consistent with previous work [14], data used for our main analyses only included perfor-
mance on test trials where children could recall the original object location for the given trail
(e.g., “Do you remember where Bill put the Chocolate bar in the beginning?”). Responses to
these questions were coded as incorrect (0) and correct (1), resulting in a final sample of 230
three to six-year-old participants (Range = 36 to 83 months; Mpass = .72, SDpass = .45).
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Preliminary analyses were conducted on the responses to these memory items to ensure that
trial exclusions based on these items were unrelated to our experimental manipulation. We
conducted a mixed effect logistic regression with a random intercept for subject to model the
repeated measurements in the R environment (see Table 2), where we predicted memory per-
formance from trial type (Outcome Known = 1, Outcome Unknown = 0), gender (0 = females,
1 = males), and age group (Reference group = 3-year-olds, 1 = 4-year-olds, 2 = 5 and 6-year-
olds). As can be seen in Table 2, age and gender, significantly predicted memory performance,
such that males were less likely to pass the memory trials compared to females, OR = 0.68
[0.49–0.96], and older children were more likely to pass the memory trials compared to youn-
ger children (4-year-olds, OR = 1.73 [1.18–2.55]; 5–6 year-olds, OR = 3.26 [2.12–5.02]). Impor-
tantly, however, trial type did not significantly predict memory performance. That is,
children’s ability to pass the memory question did not differ on Outcome Known and Out-
come Unknown trials and therefore cannot account for the experimental differences observed
below in our main analyses.
Table 1. The false belief scenarios presented by trial type and version.
Trial Version 1 Version 2
1 Outcome Known Trial: Outcome Unknown Trial:
Sally was playing with her ball, then she got hungry,
so Sally put her ball right in here (purple container),
and went home. When Sally was gone, Ryan hid
Sally’s ball in a different spot! He may have hid it
here, or here, or here (researcher pointed to the other
containers). But we know that Ryan hid the ball here
(blue container). Then, Sally came back.
Sally was playing with her ball, then she got hungry,
so Sally put her ball right in here (purple container),
and went home. When Sally was gone, Ryan hid
Sally’s ball in a different spot! He may have hid it
here, or here, or here (researcher pointed to the other
containers). But, we don’t know where he hid it.
Then, Sally came back.
2 Outcome Unknown Trial: Outcome Known Trial:
Bill was eating a chocolate bar, but he got full before
he could finish it so he put the rest of his chocolate
bar in here (red container), so he could have it later.
Then, Bill went home. When Bill was gone Jane
came, and hid his chocolate bar somewhere else! She
may have hid it here, or here, or here (researcher
pointed to the other containers). But, we don’t know
where she hid it. Then, Bill came back.
Bill was eating a chocolate bar, but he got full before
he could finish it so he put the rest of his chocolate
bar in here (red container), so he could have it later.
Then, Bill went home. When Bill was gone Jane
came, and hid his chocolate bar somewhere else! She
may have hid it here or here or here (researcher
pointed to the other containers). But we know that
Jane hid the chocolate bar here (blue container).
Then, Bill came back.
3 Outcome Known Trial: Outcome Unknown Trial:
Jenny was reading her book, and then she decided to
go to the park. So, Jenny put her book right in here
(yellow container). When Jenny left, Joe hid the book
in a different spot! Joe may have hid it in here, here,
or here (researcher pointed to the other containers).
But we know that Joe hid the book in here (red
container). Then, Jenny came back to get her book!
Jenny was reading her book, and then she decided to
go to the park. So, Jenny put her book right in here
(yellow container). When Jenny left, Joe hid the book
in a different spot! Joe may have hid it in here, or
here, or here (researcher pointed to the other
containers). But, we don’t know where Joe hid the
book. Then, Jenny came back to get her book!
4 Outcome Unknown Trial: Outcome Known Trial:
Rob was playing with his toy car, but he got thirsty
and wanted to get some water. Rob put his toy car in
here (blue container). Then, Rob went home to get
some water. Kristy came, and hid the toy car
somewhere else! Kristy may have hid the car here, or
here, or here (researcher pointed to the other
containers). But, we don’t know where Kristy hid the
car. Then, Rob came back.
Rob was playing with his toy car, but he got thirsty
and wanted to get some water. Rob put his toy car in
here (blue container), Then, Rob went home to get
some water. Kristy came, and hid the toy car
somewhere else! Kristy may have hid the car here, or
here or here (researcher pointed to the other
containers). But we know that Kristy put the car in
here (purple container). Then, Rob came back.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141.t001
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Main analyses
We analyzed children’s responses to the false belief questions for each trial (e.g., “Where will
Bill look for the chocolate bar?”). We coded their responses as correct (= 1) if they accurately
inferred the protagonist’s false belief (i.e., indicated that the protagonist will look for the object
in its original location), and as incorrect (= 0) if they did not infer the protagonist’s false belief
(i.e., indicated that the protagonist will look for the object in a different location). We con-
ducted a mixed effect logistic regression with a random intercept for participant ID to account
for the repeated measures predicting false belief performance. Fixed effect predictors included
were trial type (0 = Outcome Known, 1 = Outcome Unknown), gender (0 = females,
1 = males), age group (Ref group = 3 year olds, 4-year olds, 5-6-year olds), and version (0 = ver-
sion 1, 1 = version 2; see Table 1 for version differences). Given our prediction that younger
children would benefit the most from the reduced curse of knowledge, we also examined the
interaction between age group and trial type.
Fig 3 illustrates our focal result (see Table 3 for model summary) that 3-year-olds were pre-
dicted to perform equally well as older children (4- and 5-6-year-olds) on the false belief trials
when the location was unknown–and that when the location was known (as is in the classic
False Belief task), performance in the younger children was significantly worse. That is, when
not cursed by the outcome knowledge, younger children were just as capable of inferring false
beliefs as older children. As expected given previous literature [30, 91, 92], we found that
males performed on average worse than females across the board (see Table 3). Crucially, an
additional analysis indicated that when children failed the Outcome Known Trials, they tended
to choose the current location of the object 80% of the time, which is significantly above
chance, t(138) = 20.44, p < .001, providing evidence that participants failed the Outcome
Known trials because they were biased by their knowledge of exactly where the object was
moved (i.e., they were not responding randomly).
Interestingly, 5- and 6-year-olds who typically perform fairly well on the classic 2-container
versions of the Sally-Anne task (i.e., they pass at around a 65% average and a 75% average,
respectively; [14]) were passing at a lower rate on the current 4-container versions for both our
Outcome Known and Outcome Unknown trials. Of course, unlike a 2-container task the cur-
rent task cannot be passed by chance 50% of the time, but only 25% of the time. In other
words, in previous research children had a greater probability of succeeding by chance without
ever reasoning about a false belief. That is not to say that older children do not understand
false beliefs; they clearly do (i.e., they perform significantly above chance), but simply that per-
formance on a 2-box task is less likely to capture children’s difficulties than a task where the
Table 2. Mixed effect logistic regression with a random intercept for subject examining the effect of trial type, gender and age group on memory performance.
Memory Check (1 = Pass)
Predictors Odds Ratios CI Statistic p
(Intercept) 1.99 1.41–2.81 3.89 <0.001
Trial Type (1 = Outcome Unknown) 1.14 0.84–1.54 0.85 0.396
Gender (1 = Males) 0.68 0.49–0.96 -2.22 0.026
Age group (4-year olds) 1.73 1.18–2.55 2.80 0.005
Age group (5-6-year olds) 3.26 2.12–5.02 5.38 <0.001
N Observations 924
N ID 230
Notes: Reference category for Age group is 3-year-old participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141.t002
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Fig 3. The predicted probabilities of false belief performance by age group and trial type (predictions from model presented
in Table 3). 3-year-olds’ performance was significantly less accurate in the Outcome Known trials (i.e., when specific outcome
information was presented; estimated.26 probability of passing each trial) versus Outcome Unknown Trials (i.e., when specific
outcome information was not presented; estimated.58 probability of passing each trial). In the older age groups, predicted
probability of passing did not significantly differ by trial type (predicted probabilities ranging from.50 to.60). Notably, when the
outcome was unknown young children performed equally as well as older children. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
around the predictions, and the dashed line represents chance performance given that there were four containers. Note that all
age groups were similarly predicted to perform above chance on Outcome Unknown trials.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141.g003
Table 3. Mixed effect logistic regression with a random intercept for participant predicting false belief performance.
False Belief (1 = Pass)
Predictors Odds Ratios CI Statistic p
(Intercept) 0.34 0.14–0.82 -2.40 0.017
Trial Type (1 = Outcome Unknown) 3.91 1.64–9.31 3.08 0.002
Age group [4-year olds] 2.86 0.80–10.20 1.62 0.105
Age group [5-6-year olds] 4.21 1.18–15.03 2.21 0.027
Sex (1 = Males) 0.40 0.16–0.96 -2.05 0.041
Version (1 = Version 2) 0.59 0.24–1.48 -1.12 0.264
Trial Type � 4-year olds 0.38 0.11–1.25 -1.59 0.112
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probability of passing by chance is lower. Importantly, while 5-and 6-year-olds tend to do
much better at reasoning about false beliefs than younger children, they are by no means per-
fect [14]. Poor false belief performance in older children on modified Sally-Anne tasks is con-
sistent with other work [50, 93]. For example, Fabricius and Khalil (2003) found that adding
an additional container to the Sally-Anne task significantly worsens 4 to 6-year-old children’s
false belief performance. Specifically, in one of their experiments, the researchers found that
eighty-four 4.5 to 5.5-year-old children were 71% accurate when responding to the classic
2-box Sally-Anne task (i.e. 21% better than chance), however they were only 55% accurate
when responding to a modified 3-container false belief task (i.e. 22% better than chance).
Comparatively, our older children performed on par, or better, in our 4-box task (i.e. 34% bet-
ter than chance) as the older children in the 3-box task. The point here is simply to remind the
reader that even older children are not perfect at false belief reasoning. Importantly, however,
removing the curse of knowledge from false belief tasks allows 3-year-olds to perform on par
with 5-and-6-year-olds.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that 3-year-old children are significantly more likely to accurately infer
a false belief when they do not have specific outcome information, compared to when they have
specific outcome information. When young children knew the true location of the object, they
tended to indicate that the protagonist will look for the object in that location; that is, they
tended to fail the task because they were biased or ‘cursed’ by their own knowledge. Age analy-
ses revealed that the curse of knowledge only affected young children’s false belief reasoning
abilities, and not those of older children. Critically, these results illustrate that when the curse of
knowledge is minimized from these measures by removing specific outcome information,
3-year-olds are equally as good as older preschoolers at reasoning about others’ false beliefs.
Importantly, our main finding showing that younger children infer false beliefs more accu-
rately, when they are not cursed by their knowledge, echoes a growing body of literature sug-
gesting that the Classic Sally-Anne task underestimates children’s ability to reason about the
mind. We are not the first to make this latter claim, leading some to suggest the task should be
abandoned [e.g., 45]. However, instead of abandoning the task, we advocate for a) revisions to
the task to minimize the curse of knowledge where the intent is to specifically measure false
belief reasoning and b) reinterpretations of the substantive bodies of literature that have relied
exclusively on the standard (‘cursed’) Sally-Anne task [e.g., see 94]. Abandoning the task
would be a mistake because performance on the task has proven to be a reliable predictor of an
abundance of critical social outcomes [e.g., 37, 95, 96]. But as our results reveal, the Sally-Anne
task is not only measuring false belief reasoning, but it is also children’s ability to overcome the
curse of knowledge. For instance, the difference in children’s performance on the standard
task at age 3 versus age 5 appears to stem more from developmental change in the magnitude
of the curse of knowledge rather than a developmental change in children’s understanding of
false beliefs. Similarly, the various predictors of false belief performance that researchers have
found (e.g., presence of siblings, exposure to mental state discourse) may more accurately be
predictors of the magnitude of the curse of knowledge [97–99]. The same argument applies to
research examining the relationships between individual differences in false belief perfor-
mance and various social-emotional outcomes and indices (e.g. bullying, communication, pro-
social behavior, peer relationships, social-emotional well-being; e.g., [95, 96]). We raise the
possibility that the abundance of literature that has relied on false belief performance as a pre-
dictor of these social outcomes is tapping into differences in one’s ability to overcome the
curse of knowledge, rather than false belief reasoning per se.
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False belief reasoning and the curse of knowledge are not completely unrelated constructs
—they both involve social perspective taking. The curse of knowledge is far more pervasive in
social interactions than one’s ability to reason about false beliefs specifically—it is present any-
time you need to reason about a more naïve perspective. The detrimental impact of the curse
of knowledge bias has been documented in many applied settings including business, educa-
tion, politics, communication (both oral and written; and in medical, legal, and government
decision-making). The similarity between the two constructs may have confounded previous
research examining the Sally-Anne task, as this research may have been inadvertently measur-
ing variance in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge rather than the ability to infer a
false belief. The similarity between these two constructs also serves to highlight why young
children make more mistakes than older children and adults in everyday situations that
involve perspective taking: Young children are more apt to make perspective-taking errors—
not because they lack a concept of false beliefs, but because they are more cursed by their
knowledge.
Importantly, previous research has hinted at the effect of the curse of knowledge on young
children’s false belief reasoning. For example, to reduce inhibitory control demands, Setoh,
Scott and Baillargeon presented children with a variant of the Sally-Anne task, where children
were not told the current location of the target object, and therefore children did not have to
inhibit a prepotent response of pointing to the actual location of the target object [42, 100].
The researchers also included two practice questions to help children practice generating
responses. In this task, the researchers told children about Emma who found an apple in a
bowl, and she moved it to a box. Then, the researchers presented children with two practice
questions, each question involved showing children two pictures of two different items (e.g.,
an apple and a banana), and asking them to point at one of the items (e.g., ‘where is Emma’s
apple?’). Then, the researchers told children that in Emma’s absence, Ethan came, and he took
away the apple, and then they asked children where Emma will look for her apple.
Using this task, Setoh, Scott and Baillargeon (2016) found that 2.5-year-olds can pass the
task and indicate that Emma will look for her apple in the bowl. However, when children were
told the current location of the apple, they pointed to the current location significantly above
chance. The researchers interpreted this finding as indicative of an inhibitory control account,
where young children have not fully developed the cognitive ability to inhibit the prepotent
response to point at the current location. These findings can also be interpreted under the
curse of knowledge framework, where children have not yet developed the cognitive resources
to realize that Emma does not share their knowledge, and she does not know that her apple is
in the current location.
Other researchers have created a reality-unknown variant of the task [101] or reduced the
saliency of the ‘current location’ (the one that ultimately ‘curses’ the child) by telling children
that the secondary character ate the target object (here the target object is chocolate; [54]).
These studies have led to some mixed findings. Koos and colleagues (1997) reported an
improvement in 3-year-olds’ performance on the ‘saliency-reduced’ version compared to the
Sally-Anne task, whereas Call and Tomasello (1999) found that their reality-unknown task is
difficult for even 4-year-olds, and is as difficult as the Sally-Anne task. While these studies
offer novel and important ways of examining false belief reasoning, they do not systematically
examine the effect of outcome knowledge on children’s false belief reasoning. One study
remains unpublished [54], and the other [101] utilized a paradigm that is very different from
the Sally-Anne task and is difficult for other reasons [58, 101].
To our knowledge, our study is the first to directly examine the effect of the curse of knowl-
edge on false belief reasoning among children using identical tasks that vary solely based on
whether outcome information is presented or not. As such we contribute a new measure that
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will allow researchers to specifically examine false belief reasoning rather than the ability to
overcome the curse of knowledge. Importantly, this measure can capture younger children’s
ability to reason about false beliefs, as well as older children. In addition, using both versions
of the false belief task (Outcome Known vs Outcome Unknown) will allow researchers to spe-
cifically address whether, and which, children struggle with overcoming the curse of knowl-
edge. We advocate for the use of this ‘curse-lifted’ variant, in research examining the
relationship between children’s social perspective taking and social outcomes, instead of rely-
ing solely on the Sally-Anne task which we argue is ‘cursed’, so-to-speak, because it does not
specifically tap into false belief reasoning.
In understanding the role of the curse of knowledge in perspective taking and the nature of
the cognitive changes occurring between ages three and four, it is important to consider the
mechanisms that contribute to the curse of knowledge bias. As mentioned in the introduction
it is intuitive to imagine that the curse of knowledge is the result of deficits in inhibitory con-
trol. Although some researchers have advocated for this account [e.g., 96], inhibitory deficits
alone are insufficient to account for much of the data demonstrating the conditions under
which the bias does, and importantly does not, occur. In our view, a fluency misattribution
account is necessary in understanding the curse of knowledge. A fluency misattribution
account suggests that when information is processed fluently (i.e., it is easy to process because
it has been encountered before or it makes sense), we tend to mistake this ease in processing as
indicative of how easy or obvious this information is to others [87, 88, 102].
As an example, consider the Birch and Bloom (2007) adult false belief study mentioned
above. Recall that some adults were told that Vicky’s violin was moved to the red container
(Fig 1B; [82]), which occupied the location of the original container where she left it, and
therefore it is plausible that Vicky would look for her violin in that location (Knowledge-Plau-
sible Condition). However, in another condition within the same study, the Knowledge-
Implausible Condition (not described above), participants were told that the violin was moved
to a different container (i.e., the purple container, Fig 1) that did not occupy the old location of
the original container. So, in the Knowledgeable-Implausible Condition, participants did not
have a plausible reason to believe that Vicky would look for her violin in that container. Only
participants in the Knowledge-Plausible Condition showed the curse of knowledge in their
false belief reasoning. That is, only participants in the Knowledge-Plausible Condition, and
not participants in the Knowledge-Implausible Condition, overestimated the likelihood that
Vicky will look for her violin in its current container. Accordingly, learning new information
is not enough to lead to the curse of knowledge, the new information must make sense, or it
must fit fluently with what an individual already knows.
Similarly, children do not show a curse of knowledge anytime they learn new information,
the new information must be familiar for the bias to occur [89]. In two experiments, research-
ers asked children to estimate how many of their peers would know the answers to various fac-
tual questions. Importantly, some of the children learned familiar answers to factual questions,
and others learned unfamiliar answers to the same factual questions. Children were only
biased in their estimates of what their peers would know, when they were taught familiar
answers to the factual questions. This finding, along with many others [e.g., 82, 88, 98], high-
light the role of fluency misattribution in the curse of knowledge. While it is possible that
inhibitory control may moderate the curse of knowledge [see 81, 85, 103], the bias appears
dependent on the fluency of the information acquired.
Fluency misattribution stems from an otherwise useful metacognitive process, known as
fluency attribution. Individuals tend to use the fluency of information to guide memory infer-
ences about familiarity, or previous exposure, to a stimulus [e.g., 104–106]. In other words,
when we process a piece of information fluently, it is reasonable to infer that we have been
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exposed to this information in the past. Fluency misattribution occurs when we associate the
ease of certain information to an inaccurate source (e.g., when we mistakenly infer that the
ease of the information is attributed to how objectively obvious it is). The role of fluency misat-
tribution on children’s social perspective taking has been largely neglected thus far in the
developmental literature on social cognition but will be an especially fruitful avenue for future
research.
In sum, we argue that research examining the development of false belief reasoning and its
predictive power will benefit from a) utilizing new measures that do not require children to
also overcome the curse of knowledge bias when inferring a false belief (such as the Outcome
Unknown False Belief task used here) and b) reinterpreting previous literature bearing in
mind that what was previously considered the result of differences in the ability to reason
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interface in ASD: Complement sentences and false belief reasoning. Res Autism Spectr Disord. 2016
Jan 1; 21:109–20.
28. Joseph RM, Tager-Flusberg H. The relationship of theory of mind and executive functions to symptom
type and severity in children with autism. Dev Psychopathol [Internet]. 2004 Dec [cited 2020 Nov 26];
16(1):137–55. Available from: /pmc/articles/PMC1201455/?report = abstract https://doi.org/10.1017/
s095457940404444x PMID: 15115068
29. Pineda-Alhucema W, Aristizabal E, Escudero-Cabarcas J, Acosta-López JE, Vélez JI. Executive
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mind and academic achievementŽ. J Exp Child Psychol. 2011 Nov 1; 110(3):313–31. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jecp.2011.04.011 PMID: 21624614
39. Lecce S, Caputi M, Pagnin A. European Journal of Developmental Psychology Long-term effect of
theory of mind on school achievement: The role of sensitivity to criticismterm effect of theory of mind
on school achievement: The role of sensitivity to criticism. Eur J Dev Psychol [Internet]. 2014 [cited
2020 Nov 26]; 11(3):305–18. Available from: https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?
journalCode=pedp20
40. Poulin-Dubois D, Rakoczy H, Burnside K, Crivello C, Dörrenberg S, Edwards K, et al. Do infants
understand false beliefs? We don’t know yet–A commentary on Baillargeon, Buttelmann and South-
gate’s commentary. Vol. 48, Cognitive Development. Elsevier Ltd; 2018. p. 302–15.
41. Wang L, Leslie AM. Is Implicit Theory of Mind the “Real Deal”? The Own-Belief/True-Belief Default in
Adults and Young Preschoolers. Mind Lang. 2016; 31(2):147–76.
42. Setoh P, Scott RM, Baillargeon R. Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a traditional false-belief task
with reduced processing demands. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2016; 113(47):13360–5. https://doi.org/
10.1073/pnas.1609203113 PMID: 27821728
43. Gopnik A. Theories and illusions. Behav Brain Sci. 1993 Mar; 16(1):90–100.
44. Perner J. Understanding the representational mind. The MIT Press; 1991.
45. Bloom P, German TP. Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind. Cogni-
tion. 2000 Oct 16; 77(1):B25–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00096-2 PMID: 10980256
46. Fodor JA. A theory of the child’s theory of mind. Cognition [Internet]. 1992 [cited 2020 Jul 8]; 44
(3):283–96. /record/1993-09143-001 https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(92)90004-2 PMID: 1424495
PLOS ONE Are the classic false belief tasks cursed?
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141 February 19, 2021 16 / 19
47. He Z, Bolz M, Baillargeon R. 2.5-year-olds succeed at a verbal anticipatory-looking false-belief task.
Br J Dev Psychol [Internet]. 2012 Mar 1 [cited 2020 Jul 8]; 30(1):14–29. Available from: http://doi.
wiley.com/10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02070.x
48. Apperly IA, Butterfill SA. Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?
2009;
49. Benson JE, Sabbagh MA, Carlson SM, Zelazo PD. Individual Differences in Executive Functioning
Predict Preschoolers’ Improvement From Theory-of-Mind Training. Dev Psychol. 2012; https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0031056 PMID: 23244411
50. Fabricius W V., Khalil SL. False beliefs or false positives? Limits on children’s understanding of mental
representation. J Cogn Dev. 2003; 4(3):239–62.
51. Siegal M, Beattie K. Where to look first for children’s knowledge of false beliefs. Cognition. 1991 Jan 1;
38(1):1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(91)90020-5 PMID: 2015753
52. Chandler M, Fritz AS, Hala S. Small-Scale Deceit: Deception as a Marker of Two-, Three-, and Four-
Year-Olds’ Early Theories of Mind. Child Dev. 1989 Dec; 60(6):1263. PMID: 2612240
53. Hala S, Chandler M. The Role of Strategic Planning in Accessing False-Belief Understanding. Child
Dev [Internet]. 1996 Dec 1 [cited 2020 Oct 26]; 67(6):2948–66. Available from: http://doi.wiley.com/10.
1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01897.x PMID: 9071767
54. Koos O, Gregeley G, Csibra G, Biro S. Why eating Smarties makeyou smart? Understanding false
belief at the age of 3. In Washington, D.C.: Society of Research in Child Development; 1997.
55. Ritblatt SN. Children’s Level of Participation in a False-Belief Task, Age, and Theory of Mind. J Genet
Psychol [Internet]. 2000 [cited 2020 Nov 9]; 161(1):53–64. Available from: https://www.tandfonline.
com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=vgnt20 https://doi.org/10.1080/00221320009596694
PMID: 10705584
56. Sullivan K, Winner E. Three-year-olds0 understanding of mental states: The influence of trickery. J Exp
Child Psychol. 1993 Oct 1; 56(2):135–48. https://doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1993.1029 PMID: 8245767
57. Devine RT, Hughes C. Relations between false belief understanding and executive function in early
childhood: A meta-analysis. Child Dev [Internet]. 2014 Sep 1 [cited 2020 Jul 9]; 85(5):1777–94. Avail-
able from: https://srcd.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/cdev.12237 PMID: 24605760
58. Fizke E, Barthel D, Peters T, Rakoczy H. Executive function plays a role in coordinating different per-
spectives, particularly when one’s own perspective is involved. Cognition [Internet]. 2014; 130(3):315–
34. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.017 PMID: 24374211
59. Rubio-Fernández P, Geurts B. Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-
Belief Tasks. Rev Philos Psychol [Internet]. 2016; 7(4):835–50. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/s13164-015-0290-z
60. de Villiers PA, de Villiers JG. Deception dissociates from false belief reasoning in deaf children: Impli-
cations for the implicit versus explicit theory of mind distinction. Br J Dev Psychol. 2012; 30(1):188–
209. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02072.x PMID: 22429041
61. Hala S, Chandler M. The Role of Strategic Planning in Accessing False-Belief Understanding. Child
Dev [Internet]. 1996 Dec 1 [cited 2020 Jul 8]; 67(6):2948–66. Available from: http://doi.wiley.com/10.
1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01897.x PMID: 9071767
62. Baillargeon R, Scott RM, He Z. False-belief understanding in infants. Vol. 14, Trends in Cognitive Sci-
ences. Elsevier Current Trends; 2010. p. 110–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006 PMID:
20106714
63. Luo Y. Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs? Cognition. 2011 Dec 1; 121(3):289–
98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.07.011 PMID: 21861998
64. Onishi KK, Baillargeon R. Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science (80-). 2005 Apr
8; 308(5719):255–8. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621 PMID: 15821091
65. Scott RM, Baillargeon R. Early False-Belief Understanding. Vol. 21, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
Elsevier Ltd; 2017. p. 237–49.
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